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 There are two established ways of recounting the emergence of the modern Gulf oil 
monarchies: One type, the social scientific one, tends to tell the reader of anonymous 
structural forces, of the “resource curse”, of the “rentier state”, and of how these forces have 
shaped politics and markets with their inexorable logic. The other narrative, of the popular 
history variety, offers us romantic, personalized accounts of desert shaykhs, their whims, and 
the sudden riches of their families (complemented by tales of monumental corruption in some 
less benevolent tales).  
 
In its analysis of the creation of the Saudi Arabian administration, this article will, to a 
surprising degree perhaps, side with the shaykhs. This is despite – or rather because of – its 
ambition of being theoretically informed: By stressing the role of elite decisions in the process 
of state creation in Saudi Arabia, it will try to bring personality and politics back into the 
structurally over-determined accounts of the creation of Gulf states and rentier systems in 
general.1  
 
The article will look specifically at the formative period of state formation between 1951 
and 1962, when the interplay of administrative growth and elite politics, patronage and 
factionalism was the most intense and the institutional setting the most fluid. The account has 
three main explanatory aims: First, to explain how early conflicts and deals between senior 
political figures “congealed” into institutional constellations which have shaped the 
kingdom’s political landscape until today. Rapidly growing oil income temporarily gave the 
Saudi political elite great autonomy in designing the shape of their expanding state, and 
institutions were unusually flexible tokens in power games.  
 
Secondly, the article intends to explain how the Saudi administration developed a certain 
degree of segmentation early on, i.e. the tendency of various institutions to be little “states 
within the state” – a feature closely related to the early personalization of institutional design. 
This segmentation has allowed the emergence of a few very efficient bureaucratic islands, but 
has also led to failures of coordination and the parallel building of neo-patrimonial 
bureaucratic fiefdoms, a feature still much in evidence in today’s kingdom. Increasing 
bureaucratization and regularization has often only solidified these cleavages. 
 
Thirdly, the article explains how the extreme social mobility offered by a rapidly 
expanding state and its social networks created new players in the economic and political 
elite. This fluidity is in marked contrast to today’s mature and very static Saudi system in 
which most stakes have been “parcelled out”, both in business and bureaucracy. Much of the 
Saudi elite and its institutions were made in a dozen dizzying years in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
In theoretical terms, the aim of the article is to nuance several of the assumptions of the 
debate on “rentier states” by closely looking at the actual history of bureaucratic evolution of 
Saudi Arabia, the literature’s staple rentier example. I intend to show that the autonomy of 
rentier states is not constant over time, as constraints grow with bureaucratic expansion. I also 
demonstrate that external state income does not necessarily lead to inefficient institutions, but 
rather opens great leeway for institutional design which can be highly efficient in some areas 
and patrimonial in others.  
 
The article is divided into two halves: One describes the early jumble of institutional 
growth which went along with growing oil income and the expansion of Al Saud princes into 
the state after 1951. The second half recounts how a more permanent distribution of power 
and institutional resources emerged from the fundamental struggle between King Saud and 
Crown Prince Faisal. A briefer section explains how the dispensation which had emerged by 
1962 subsequently grew and was consolidated, with the Saudi state apparatus moving from 
great fluidity to bureaucratization and eventually great stasis – immortalizing the institutional 
outcomes of earlier struggles. 
 
My account is almost exclusively based on primary sources, significant parts of which are 
previously unexploited. I have used archives on three continents, including US and British 
diplomatic documents up to 1975, the extensive records of a 1960s/70s Ford Foundation 
mission on administrative reform held at the Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh, the 
Mulligan Papers at Georgetown University, and the Philby archive at St. Antony’s College in 
Oxford. I have moreover conducted interviews with seasoned diplomats, expatriate advisors 
and former Saudi bureaucrats in London and Riyadh. Finally, I draw on a large number of 
PhDs written by Saudis in the West about Saudi administrative development issues, a number 
of contemporary country studies and reports in 1950s and 1960s trade journals.  
 
The literature 
While much has been written on the impact of the USA on the formation of modern Saudi 
Arabia,2 little research has been done on the internal politics of the formation of the modern 
Saudi state. 
 
Sarah Yizraeli’s valuable “The remaking of Saudi Arabia”3 remains the only account 
primarily concerned with Saudi elite politics in the 1950s and early 60s, which I hope to 
complement from a more institutional perspective: Yizraeli concentrates mainly on the 
struggle between Faisal, Saud and their princely followers and is less concerned with the 
formation and composition of bureaucracy as such. The fiefdom character and segmentation 
of administration and its interplay with personal politics on various levels therefore are not in 
the focus of her analysis, which results in a certain overemphasis on the “modern” aspects of 
institutional growth and differentiation under Faisal. 
 
While Yizraeli focuses strongly on persons, the other main account of modern state 
formation in Saudi Arabia, Kiren Aziz Chaudhry’s “The Price of Wealth”, conversely talks 
almost exclusively about structural economic forces and institutions. Individual actors are 
largely absent from her account, which means that many specifics of institution-building I 
focus on go unexplained, and rationality and capacity of the early Saudi administration are 
considerably exaggerated.4 My claim is that focusing on the interplay of personal politics and 
institutional formation offers the most adequate perspective on the formative years of the 
modern Saudi state. 
 
In addition to contributing to the still very thin historiography of Saudi state-building, my 
ambition is to challenge and contextualize several of the broader theoretical claims of rentier 
state theories, for which Saudi Arabia has often been used as archetypical case. There is no 
fully formulated, generally accepted rentier state theory. There are however a number of 
recurring hypotheses connected to effects of oil income on politics.  
 
First, rentier theorists usually argue that oil income grants state elites increased autonomy 
from social forces.5 Kiren Chaudhry was right to challenge this generalization in her account 
of the economic crisis in the 1980s,6 in which entrenched distributional coalitions managed to 
stall the regime’s austerity policies. I argue, however, that regime autonomy was considerably 
higher at an early state of state-building, before distributional networks and entitlements were 
established on a large scale. In other words, state autonomy of rentier states seems to decline 
over time. This highlights the importance of early institutional decisions, which can create 
strong path-dependencies which are not accounted for in “static” rentier theories. 
 Secondly, my ambition is to disaggregate the state, which is usually dealt with in the 
aggregate by rentier theorists7 (and, implicitly, by Kiren Chaudhry too, as she sees all state 
institutions subject to the same, although shifting, development dynamics over time). By 
breaking up the state on a meso-level, I show that different parts of it have followed different 
trajectories, some developmental, some regressive – largely depending on how early elite 
decisions shaped institutions. There is no automatic mechanism producing regulatory failure 
and rent-seeking in rentier states.8  
 
My account offers a way to look at the crucial role of oil in state-building without succumbing 
to rentier state determinism. As Jill Crystal has shown on the cases of Kuwait and Qatar, 
crucial junctures of regime formation shape later political options.9 What she does for state-
business relations, I do for politics within the state. Michael Herb has drawn our attention to 
the dynamics of “dynastic rule” to explain elite politics and regime survival in the Gulf.10 I 
analyze the impact of dynastic rule on state formation. 
 
The state of the state in the early to mid 1950s 
 
“Verily, my children and my possessions are my enemies” (Ibn Saud briefly before his 
death)11  
 
Patrimonial rule under Abdalaziz  
Modern bureaucracy is a recent phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. Its first elements were 
created in the early 1950s during King Abdalaziz’ last years, when oil income was taking off. 
In the lean years before, the kingdom had not been ruled through a differentiated 
administrative apparatus, but rather through trusted regional governors installed by the king, 
supported by other local intermediaries and clients, be it notables or tribal shuyukh.  
 
On the national level, the system completely revolved around Abdalaziz, who was king, 
chief legislator and had the right to review all judicial decisions.12 Most of the departments at 
Abdalaziz’ court were occupied with the logistics of the court itself and not broader 
administration or public services.13 In the Western Province, taken from the Hashemites in the 
mid-1920s, Abdalaziz had inherited a somewhat more elaborate bureaucratic structure, with 
special offices e.g. for health and education.14  
 
Altogether, however, most Saudis had no contact with formal administration, as apart from 
basic security, the state provided hardly any services to its citizens. There were few formal, 
national bodies during most of Abdalaziz’ reign: A ministry of foreign affairs had been set up 
in 1930 under Faisal. Ministries of Finance and Defense followed in 1937 and 1944. These 
agencies were not linked through formal mechanisms of budgeting or governance.15  
 
After WWII, oil income started to grow rapidly – from 10.4 million US$ in 1946 to 56.7 
million US$ in 1950.16 While old Abdalaziz’ personal rule grew increasingly slack due to his 
frailty,17 there was a growing need to manage the huge sums of money flowing into the 
kingdom, as at least his second oldest surviving son Faisal and the American diplomats and 
oilmen present at the time realized.18 In the absence of any scheme for budgeting and 
development, much of the growing oil income was frittered away by the court, its clients and 
their entourages.19 There was another reason for institution-building: With the unquestioned 
patriarch leaving the stage, a new generation of princes vied for power and prestige,20 giving 
them a stake in the creation of new posts and ministries.  
 
Analysis: a state created above society   
The state would soon start to grow rapidly, providing posts for numerous princely 
aspirants. In the following I will indeed argue that the way the state grew was an outcome 
largely of royal elite decisions unconstrained by larger political forces. To substantiate that, 
some social history is needed before I engage with princely dealings in detail. 
 
In the 1950s, the national income was still extremely small by standards of modern 
statehood. However, the aggregate societal demands on it were even smaller:21 Saudi society, 
based on an economy which in most regions barely provided for subsistence needs, was 
unprepared for the riches. Most politics was local as people were ruled through the Al Saud’s 
tribal or notable intermediaries. The kingdom knew no public space to negotiate over national 
budgets, which were fed externally and grew rather suddenly. Saudi Arabia had no national 
constitution, no formal mechanisms of political participation, and no experience of national 
politics. Society was deeply geographically fragmented. 
 
There were no large and coherent social groups to voice demands towards the government. 
Merchants were quickly tied up in patronage structures.22 Their Chambers of Commerce were 
state-created, state-dependent and had little voice in policy-making.23 Aramco researchers 
described Saudi businessman as “more individualistic” than their counterparts in other places, 
not interested in collective bargaining24 – which is indeed completely absent from the 
historical record. 
 
Similarly, the independent power of tribes had been crushed in the course of Abdalaziz’ 
conquest of the peninsula in the 1920s and 1930s,25 and were subsequently co-opted through 
royal subsidies, without much modern state infrastructure interfering or being demanded.26 
The kingdom had no working class – with the exception of Aramco workers in the Eastern 
Province, whose demonstrations were harshly repressed in the 1950s and 1960s.27 
Newspapers were all closely supervised by the state, their boards usually controlled by princes 
or senior public servants.28  
 
Robert Vitalis cites a US labor attaché’s early 1950s conclusion that Aramco “can ignore 
public opinion, which is neither a force nor a voice”29. American “New Dealers” on a 
technical cooperation mission looked in vain for grassroots initiatives to support in Saudi 
society. Municipal elections in the early 1960s were purely local phenomena in which 
governors could clearly control who would get elected and who not,30 and in which the 
population at large tended to take limited interest.31 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there 
were no parties or other national interest organizations to speak of. The consultative council 
still extant in the Western Province had no real political role and no popular backing.32 
 
The Saudi ulama, finally, were an important part of the ruling elite, but despite popular 
myths, consistently deferred to royal prerogative, as was indeed their ideology.33 As far as 
they played a role on policy, this concerned matters of public morals, but not the specifics of 
bureaucracy-building.34 
 
With no national political traditions and most Saudis not in touch with the administration, 
society hardly constrained the decisions which royal elites took on building their state. A 
unique pattern of bureaucracy-building ensued in which yet embryonic institutions became 
tokens of intra-elite bargaining among ambitious princes, and a limited number of commoners 
clients. There was of course an underlying concern to build institutions which could 
administer the increasing flow of oil income35 – but beyond this very general need, personal 
ambitions and bargains loomed very large in determining specific outcomes. 
 
In 1951 Abdalaziz created the basis for a rudimentary functional differentiation of 
domestic bureaucratic institutions, separating the Ministry of Interior (MoI) from the fiscal 
and administrative affairs of the Ministry of Finance. Differentiation meant spread of the royal 
family into state posts: The MoI was given to Faisal’s son Abdallah.36 In December 1953, 
briefly after Abdalaziz’ death, the Ministries of Education and Agriculture were officially 
established as spin-offs from the Ministries of Interior and Finance respectively. Aspiring 
Prince Sultan took charge of agriculture, his full brother Fahd of education.  
 
There were few functioning mechanisms to coordinate their work: The formal introduction 
of a Council of Ministers in 1953, briefly before Abdalaziz’ death, had changed little about 
actual practices of governance. New King Saud, Abdalaziz’ oldest surviving son governed 
according to the patrimonial style of his father, basing his rule on the court and embarking on 
grand tours through the country in which he disbursed royal largesse.37 Decision-making on 
major national questions remained largely informal,38 and although service provision 
improved in some sectors, governance was marred by “princely jealousies”.39  
 
Institutional design: “form follows family” 
It was largely intra-family patrimonial politics which determined who would receive 
which government post – not different from other clan-based, administratively 
underdeveloped political systems. However, patrimonial politics also determined much of the 
very institutional design of the rapidly growing state during Abdalaziz’ last years and under 
his first successor.  
 
Institutions in the 1950s were malleable and often adjusted to the authority and status of 
the persons or factions leading them – or occasionally created from scratch to either bolster or 
weaken specific players. Although there was a general trend of functional differentiation, 
concerns of power balancing were as important in the emergence of specific bureaucratic 
designs: princes had to be accorded roles according to their seniority, while also satisfying 
their ambitions as far as possible. In summer 1951, Abdallah bin Faisal was made Minister of 
Health and Interior for the reported reason that he should be equal in status to Minister of 
Defense Prince Mishcal.40 Conversely, the likely motivation for a 1952 plan to set up a 
Ministry of Air Force, with Mishcal as minister and his full brother Mitcib as deputy, was to 
prevent aviation issues from falling under the authority of the new Ministry of 
Communications under Prince Talal.41 At some point in 1953, it seemed that Saudi Arabia 
would have to separate government airlines, as Mishcal and Talal could not agree.42  
 
When Talal resigned as Minister of Communications in 1955, the Communications 
portfolio was reassigned to the Ministry of Finance (then under the commoner Mohammad 
Suroor). Talal told US diplomats that this was essentially a solution to avoid picking one of 
the various princely candidates for the post and offending the others.43 There was no 
indication that qualification played a great role in creating and apportioning posts: more 
talented princes operated next to worse ones.44 As far as we know, no prince was ever fired 
for performance failure in the 1950s or 1960s. Although the historical record does not allow 
us to establish the precise motivations for every specific institutional decision, we can 
conclude that balances of power and personal ambitions within the Al Saud have played a 
uniquely prominent role. 
 
It seems that the tailoring of institutions around personal needs and conflicts was also 
reproduced on a smaller scale among senior commoner administrators: Then Deputy Minister 
of Finance Mohammad Suroor e.g. was given a new post for the supervision of both 
pilgrimage and broadcasting for the reason that the heads of these two departments were 
rivals, and making Suroor titular head of both meant that none would be subordinate to the 
other.45 When Saudi ambassador to the US Asad Al-Faqih returned to the kingdom in 1955, a 
new senior post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created according to his own 
proposal.46 Although skills often did matter for selecting commoner administrators (such as 
oil minister Abdallah Tariki or Minister of State Abdallah bin cAdwan), structures of 
clientelism and long-term loyalty also played a prominent role, often to the detriment of 
performance.47 
 
Under King Saud, senior appointments and institutional changes were increasingly a 
function of his rivalry with Crown Prince Faisal. Apart from Talal, all new princely 
appointments to his “reform” cabinet had no administrative experience to speak ok,48 clearly 
indicating that building a coalition in the family was his main concern. The Saud-Faisal 
struggle has been recounted in detail elsewhere.49 A few examples of how it affected the 
institutional set-up of the kingdom will suffice. The defence establishment was a prime 
battleground, in terms of successive appointments, but also administrative engineering. King 
Saud detached the Royal Guard under Muscad bin Saud from the Ministry of Defense to 
weaken Mishcal and strengthen his own sons. The Guard temporarily was the most powerful 
military unit.50 In May 1955, Saud decreed the formation of a modern National Guard which 
was to be headed by another of his sons, Khalid bin Saud. This again was seen as a step 
against Mishcal, who had been able to prey on National Guard resources before, as it had been 
a relatively weak institution headed by a commoner.51 In 1964, after Saud’s final defeat by 
Faisal, the Royal Guard was attached to the Ministry of Defence, implying its disbandment as 
independent institution. Institutional design followed power politics, sometimes resulting in 
the parallel existence of very similar structures.52 
 
Institutions as fiefdoms 
Institutions being tokens in political games, they would also be used for building personal 
fortunes and expanding one’s following. Proprietary patterns were established early on: In his 
later years, Abdalaziz had “granted” several of the new agencies to specific factions among 
his sons, a process in which maternal lines played an important role. Examples include the 
Royal Guard, the governorships of Riyadh and Mecca and the Ministry of Defense, all 
controlled successively by full brothers. Control of specific institutions through factions 
within the Al Saud has been a prevalent pattern ever since. Similarly, well-positioned 
commoner families would develop a permanent claim over certain offices.53 
 
Most senior figures used the institutions they controlled to personally distribute favours and 
conclude business deals. King Saud himself built up a following of contractors whom he 
delighted with large contracts for palaces and grossly oversized ministries.54 Minister of 
Defence Mishcal – known as one of the richest princes in subsequent decades55 – was said to 
have used his privileged post to keep millions of freshly minted riyals for himself, as did a 
number of regional governors.56 Most princes in bureaucratic positions quickly surrounded 
themselves with growing numbers of hangers-on, advisors and business partners.57 
 
Different princes had different followings: Saud tended to cling to the old foreign advisors of 
his father,58 whereas Faisal had a larger number of Hijazi among his clients.59 Fahd later on 
would bring more young educated Najdis into the state apparatus.60 Senior clients all had an 
urban background in common: often from client notable families, sometimes upstarts of 
indistinct background who would work their way up as loyal servants. Tribes were not 
represented in the new elite.61 More important in our context is that the elite was very small in 
size and built in a top-down fashion by princes, with hierarchies between princes and 
commoners very strict.62 Clienteles were local and did not represent broader social groups, as 
most of society remained outside of the state’s reach. 
 
Formal and informal authority in a fluctuating bureaucracy 
Saudi Arabia largely lacked an administrative tradition and societal checks on the 
bureaucracy. Combined with family politics, this meant that the unprecedented growth of the 
bureaucracy in the 1950s was not accompanied by much rationalization. Although some new 
agencies helped to increase the provision of public services,63 the sudden availability of 
resources also led to uncontrolled, Byzantine expansion based on patronage.  
 
Many of the young administrators were highly inexperienced, especially the royal ones, who 
had without exception been educated only in the royal court.64 A US dispatch described 
Minister of Defence Mishcal as dignified and serious about his job, but in terms of institution-
building, “through lack of education, knowledge and experience, performance results have 
been practically nil as the Ministry remains unorganized and its procedures are on an entirely 
personal basis. He [Mishcal] leans heavily for advice and recommendations on foreign 
counsel.”65 Similarly, by the time Talal’s Ministry of Communications was reattached to 
Finance, he was said to have achieved very little.66 
 
The personalized nature of institutions went along with a lack of meaningful formal 
procedures. In the 1950s, there were no proper systems of civil service training, seniority or 
even document filing.67 The US embassy at the time was trying to keep track of administrative 
development and drew charts of agencies, but “…the diagrams themselves have proved to be 
most confused, since this Government does not lend itself at all well to such schematic 
presentation, …the organization is so confused, particularly among the lower echelons, that an 
unwarranted level of research would be required in order to fill out charts at all these 
levels…since organization means little to this Government, it is very flexible and changes 
with such rapidity that charts are outmoded almost before they can be prepared.”68  
 
Aramco at the time kept a roster of Saudi public personnel, on which the government itself 
depended due to lack of oversight over its fluctuating institutions.69 Several agencies, such as 
the Ministry of Economy created in July 1953, remained merely on paper,70 as did senior 
ministerial positions.71 When posts were actually filled, they frequently were just depositories 
for clients of ministers or princes, adding “excess baggage” to the bureaucracy.72 
 
Informal authority determined the actual importance of institutions: The bits of 
bureaucracy which mattered were run by important princes or by commoners very close to the 
court. A formally important institution like the Ministry of Commerce, although headed by 
leading Hijazi merchant Mohammad Alireza, proved to be largely powerless.73 Undercut by 
successive Ministers of Finance with better royal access, and with no commercial regulations 
emerging from the Council of Ministers, he complained about de facto having no role.74  
Conversely, a previously inconsequential post such as that of comptroller general suddenly 
became important when it was filled by senior prince Muscad bin cAbdalrahman.75 
 
As far as institutions mattered, their day-to-day operations were often carried out rather 
autonomously, with ministries run as fiefdoms.76 The administrative sprawl and personalized 
nature of authority meant that coordination between agencies was largely lacking, with 
different institutions often producing directly contradictory decisions and jurisdictions 
remaining unclear.77 As early as 1952, six different entities were supposed to be in charge of 
economic planning.78  
 
State-society relations: mobility and local clientelism 
While the formal state was still small, unorganized and self-absorbed, its combination of 
growing resources and institutional fluidity meant that it offered great chances for the rather 
small number of those who were in the right place at the right time. Access to the expanding 
court with its growing needs for material supplies from the 1940s on offered great 
opportunities of social and economic mobility and influence-peddling. Many of the big Saudi 
merchant families established their privileged positions as suppliers to King Abdalaziz, some 
of them being granted exclusive trade agencies by the king which they still hold today. 
Players from the Jomaih, Rajhi or Juffali families made their first appearance at the time, 
often emerging from rather humble Najdi background (Jomaih e.g. was the grocer of the king 
from the village of Shaqra, Rajhi a money-changer in the Riyadh suq).79 Several of the 
advisors of the king and their offspring also used their positions to venture into business, 
including the Pharaon and Khashoggi families.  
 
In a related pattern, auxiliary positions at the court could be the starting point of public 
service careers. Abdallah bin cAdwan for example worked his way up to head of the important 
Ministry of Finance branch in the (oil-rich) Eastern Province without any formal education, 
thanks to the intervention of then Crown Prince Saud, whose bodyguard he had been.80 Id bin 
Salem moved from being a mechanic to head of the royal garage and one of Saud’s leading 
advisors.81 Interpreters Abdallah Tariqi and Mohamad Ibrahim Mascud (the latter with the US 
embassy) would become Minister of Oil and Minister of State respectively.82 
 
Abdallah Sulaiman’s empire: mobility of commoners 
It is the Najdi Sulaiman Al-Hamdan family which probably has combined both patterns – 
merchant and bureaucratic mobility – most masterfully. Their story colourfully illustrates the 
contingent, personalized and fiefdom-like trajectory of early institution-building as well as the 
great associated opportunities of clientelism.  
 
Abdallah Sulaiman was a Najdi of humble background who worked his way up from clerk 
to first Saudi Minister of Finance and close confidant of Abdalaziz. Until the early 50s, 
Sulaiman’s Ministry combined an inordinate range of administrative duties, its subordinate 
departments including health, public works, education and agriculture. Their workings usually 
were opaque and left great scope for patronage. The Ministry was well-known for its 
“widespread system of letting contracts on a basis of personal favoritism rather than expected 
performance and cost”,83 the beneficiaries usually being Sulaiman’s merchant friends.84 
 
At the MoF-affiliated customs, Ottoman-inspired clearing procedures involved up to 30 
different signatures and kickbacks were common. A British diplomat commented sardonically 
that “The Director of Posts proudly proclaims that he had British training. There are naturally 
Saudi improvements on this; the postage stamp clerk, for instance, will take the money for 
letters and stick the stamps on later; after eighteen months in the job he can build himself a 
large house.”85  
 
Sulaiman himself, based in Jeddah, was given large administrative discretion by the 
king.86 His brother Hamad and his son Abdalaziz were vice and deputy minister respectively, 
the higher rank for his brother being created specifically for him (it still exists today).87 Apart 
from profiteering activities, Hamad was reported to be largely inactive.88  
 
Sulaiman had started to procure government supplies through figureheads in the 1920s, 
and his friends among the merchants lent him money without interest, which was in turn used 
to purchase goods for the court for inflated prices.89 He was given the lucrative cement 
franchise for the Hijaz in the late 40s.90 Sulaiman owned palaces and large tracts of land, and 
had his own entourage of some 400 people. After retiring in 1954, he ran hotels and a number 
of trading companies. His descendants still are among the prominent merchants of Jeddah.91 
 
Several big businessmen were “made” or at least boosted by the MoF at Sulaiman’s time, 
including some who served under him.92 The case of Hasan Sharbatli is perhaps the most 
colorful example of how upstart clients could rapidly gain status and wealth. The diplomatic 
note on him bears a lengthy citation:  
 
“Climaxing a rags-to-riches career illustrative of the fluidity of Hejazi mercantile society, 
Hasan Sharbatli, Jidda merchant and public benefactor, recently received from the King 
the title of Honorary Minister of State,” making him the ninth of this kind. The title 
“implies no necessary assumption of government powers…Sharbatli, who only ten years 
ago was a fruit-vendor and small-time auctioneer in Jidda, reportedly gained entry into 
the favored circles of the Ministry of Finance by sending to Hamad al SULEIMAN, 
brother of the minister, a gift of fruit. So pleased was the recipient that he recommended 
the appointment of Sharbatli as Government Purchasing Agent.  
 
In this capacity, Sharbatli evolved an eminently satisfactory relationship with the 
government. Selling a hypothetical 5,000 riyals worth of fruit, he would then bill the 
Ministry for 50,000 riyals and subsequently share the profits with his sponsors in the 
Ministry.”93 
 
Sharbatli accumulated a total reported credit of 43 million Saudi Riyal with the 
government. Unable to redeem the debt for himself, Sharbatli became one of the biggest 
charitable benefactors in the kingdom, recovering some of the sums for this purpose. He had 
become one of the richest men in the kingdom, had a virtual monopoly on pilgrim travel and 
had reportedly given 500.000 Riyal for the establishment of the Saudi Air Force.94 He also set 
up his own bank.95 Sharbatli’s case illustrates that, although the royal family was clearly at the 
center of the polity and of state growth, more or less random networks of commoners within 
and around the administration had great distributional leeway and offered great mobility at an 
early stage – and the chance to position oneself for later decades. 
 
The story of Sulaiman himself however also demonstrates how the local power of 
commoners in the final analysis depends on royal patronage: The minister was a favourite of 
King Abdalaziz, but not of his sons Saud and Faisal. Sulaiman and his family left the Ministry 
one year after Abdalaziz’ death. Even the most senior and trusted commoner with a large 
personal clientele did not have any independent support he could count on once fallen out of 
favour. 
 
External advisors and islands of efficiency: SAMA  
Before that, however, Sulaiman had rather surprisingly got involved in probably the most 
significant attempt at administrative rationalization in the 1950s: the creation of the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). In the early 50s, monetary chaos reigned in Saudi 
Arabia.96 Interested in minimal economic stability, the US embassy and Aramco successfully 
lobbied with the king to accept US consultants into the kingdom.  
 
US advisor Arthur Young managed to convince Sulaiman and the king of the need for 
basic monetary and banking regulation. Young was mandated by the king to draw up a charter 
for what was to become SAMA within a few hours.97 SAMA would derive its income by 
charging the government for its services. Its first head was also an American, and accountants 
were hired from Lebanon.98  
 King Abdalaziz and Sulaiman had been convinced of the existential need for institution-
building in this strategic sector. SAMA charter and use of expatriate technocrats bolstered the 
relative independence of the body. After temporary sidelining of SAMA by the MoF,99 in 
1957 the governorship was taken over by another expatriate, Anwar Ali, who had come to the 
country with an IMF mission and who was to hold the post as a confidant of King Faisal until 
his death in 1974. Different from other “fiefdom ministries”, SAMA’s well-paid leadership 
would use its relative autonomy and Abdulaziz’ and Faisal’s clear reform mandates to become 
one of the best central banks in the Middle East.  
 
The specific social and political structure of Saudi Arabia gave its political elite large 
temporary autonomy – in this specific regard confirming rentier theory. The new external 
income left much space for the individual patronage interests of state actors, and for 
distribution and institutional design to be negotiated within the state. Much of the modern 
state was originally created above society, following its own peculiar logic of fiefdoms and 
their lateral sprawl. In the 1950s, Aramco and the US embassy were probably the most 
significant lobbyists for bureaucratic rationalization in the kingdom, ahead of all domestic 
groups.100 
 
The emerging bureaucratic order under Faisal 
Faisal’s order by cabinet 
US pressure was largely ineffective under Saud, with politics and institutional change 
following elite dynamics as described above: despite US lobbying, no coherent budgeting 
happened,101 and an American Point IV assistance mission was cancelled.102 It was under 
Faisal that some degree of order was brought into the government apparatus, as is explained in 
the following section. But again, this was at least as much driven by royal family politics as 
by perceived development needs. Faisal’s struggle with Saud was at its apex between 1958 
and 1962, and it was in this period that institutions were reshaped most dynamically, with the 
power interests of the Faisal faction eventually prevailing. After 1962, a stable balance of elite 
forces combined with bureaucratic growth and regularization led to the “locking in” of 
personal and institutional constellations at the core of the state.  
 
Some of the institutional balancing games between Faisal and Saud in the field of security 
organization have already been adumbrated. After 1958, the struggle between the two brothers 
went deeper than that, however: The core of what the Saudi state was to be was at stake in the 
conflict, with fundamentally different institutional concepts deployed by both players, 
reflecting the fluidity of Saudi governance structures at the time. 
 
The Saudi drive for political order began with a May 1958 decree which enhanced the 
status of the Council of Ministers, with Faisal as Prime Minister. The reason was that a 
coalition within the Al Saud had pushed for enhancing Faisal’s standing against Saud, who 
was, among other things, perceived to be favouring his sons over his brothers and incapable of 
handling the state budget, which was in severe deficit.  
 
The decree gave the Council of Ministers the final authority in financial matters. The king 
could return decrees to the Council, with further steps kept ambiguous. Although a step 
towards formal government, the May 58 institutional redesign most of all reflected a 
temporary personal balance of power between Faisal and Saud, as Saud was to remain king 
and Faisal responsible to him.  
 
Institutions at the very core of the state were pliable weapons in the struggle. Saud as king 
with a court had larger quasi-traditional, patrimonial resources at his disposal and used those 
to increase his following through royal hand-outs and tours through the country. Faisal, 
conversely, promoted more modern institutions of rule to boost his otherwise inferior 
standing, trying to curtail the royal budget and enforce cabinet rule. There was no superior 
constitutional (or societal) framework to contain the struggle to be fought out within given 
institutions.  
 
The brothers’ attitudes towards institutions could be quite instrumental, a point vindicated 
by the institutional track record of the two protagonists: In 1959 Saud reportedly planned 
creating a Consultative Council with 120 members, including tribal representatives, ulama 
and members of the Al Saud. It would take over some responsibilities of the Council of 
Ministers and hold legislative power. 103 It very much looked like an attempt of Saud, at that 
time inferior, to regain territory, as the king would appoint the Majlis. It is striking that 
supposedly “traditional” Saud would forward such a relatively progressive concept. 
Conversely, Faisal was very reluctant to give up his traditional post as viceregent of the Hijaz, 
although that hampered homogenization of the national administration in Saudi Arabia. He 
used the post as a bargaining chip to attain the premiership.104 If politically expedient, Faisal 
could hamper bureaucratic rationalization.  
 
Conversely, Faisal’s build-up of bureaucracy was completely centred around his person. Until 
Saud temporarily regained power in 1960, Faisal achieved a certain separation of state and 
royal family affairs and a degree of budgetary control and monetary modernization with IMF 
assistance.105 This he accomplished through stark centralization of authority, however. In 
addition to being Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance, in April 1959 he also took over the 
Interior portfolio. Although this enabled Faisal to exert more control over regional fiefdoms of 
other princes, it created a bottleneck of decision-making.106 Rated a thorough individualist by 
Aramco researchers, Faisal sat on decisions.107 Liberal Saudis, although sometimes conceding 
that Faisal stuck to formal rules more clearly than Saud, deplored such over-centralization.108 
 
The Council of Ministers was, most of all, an instrument for Faisal to gain power through 
the post of Prime Minister.109 It is true that after Saud’s fall from grace in 1962, it improved 
policy coordination somewhat – not least because the royal diwan as parallel political actor 
had disappeared. Faisal was generally willing to devote more time to the formal workings of 
government,110 seeing a degree of budgetary control and more clearly defined administrative 
units as instruments of stability. Most of his reformist ambitions beyond the establishment of 
basic order petered out soon after Saud had been stripped off all powers in 1964, however. In 
a period of regional turmoil, Faisal was interested in stability, not rapid development. 
 
Saud, through his alliance with junior princes, seemed to temporarily introduce more 
players into decision-making. This was an outcome of his alliance strategy though, as was the 
progressive-developmentalist orientation of the new cabinet – he had relied on his father’s 
small and closed group of decidedly reactionary Syrian advisors before.111 His younger royal 
allies in turn were further down in the seniority ranking – one can speculate that they saw 
progressive politics as a shortcut to positions of power otherwise unavailable to them.  
 
In any case, the reformist episode proved short-lived, as Faisal’s coalition with Fahd and 
his full brothers drove out first Talal and his brothers, then Saud. Tellingly, it was the group 
which had built the larger alliance within the royal family which carried the day. At no point 
in the struggle were broader social constituencies mobilized.112 Talal and his princely allies 
might have banked on support by “young intellectuals”, having seen the revolutionary 
examples of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. In Saudi Arabia, however, this stratum remained small, 
amorphous and incapable of action. Talal failed to rouse support.113  
 When progressive advisor Abdalaziz Mucammar briefly gained agenda-setting power 
under Saud, this did not reflect a social revolution, but rather a temporary power vacuum 
between different royal factions. Mucammar and his small circle of friends had no 
organizational base to rely on and were quickly thrown out when Saud decided they were 
doing damage to him. At any rate, Mucammar always knew that Saud had deployed him as 
part of a “power play”114 and not because of a suddenly discovered reformist zeal. Other 
“progressive” young Saudis such as Zaki Yamani and Hisham Nazer got the message and had 
themselves coopted into senior administrative positions as docile technocrats under Faisal. 
Commoner administrators quickly stopped speechifying about political reform.115 
 
Consolidation of fiefdoms: the 1962 cabinet deal 
Throughout the 1960s, the Saudi budgets once again continued to expand – quadrupling 
within less than a decade116 –, and the bureaucratic apparatus grew with them, offering new 
mobility chances for commoners. Ministries of Petroleum, Hajj affairs, Labour and Social 
Affairs and Information were created between 1960 and 1963. After 1963 and until the oil 
boom, however, the growth of the budget implied growth of existing institutions rather than 
creation of new ones. The expansion of a number of fiefdoms would continue, but in a much 
more orderly manner.  
 
The cabinet which had emerged in October 1962 had become the gravitational center of 
Saudi politics and represented a post-Saud distribution of power which grew increasingly 
immovable. It was based on a stable balance of forces within the Al Saud and was the end 
result of the Saud-Faisal struggle. Faisal kept the post of prime minister, which he would fuse 
with the kingship from 1964 on (a structure his successors have inherited).117 Faisal’s senior 
allies in the conflict were rewarded with ministerial posts: Fahd and Sultan, young and 
“modernizing” supporters, were given the portfolios of Interior and Defence, respectively. 
 
Sticking to established patrimonial patterns, they brought in full brothers to take up 
specially designated vice ministry posts in subsequent years.118 Sultan has kept his ministry 
ever since, while Fahd handed his portfolio over to his younger brother Nayef when becoming 
Crown Prince in 1975. Prince Abdallah, another ally of Faisal, was given cabinet status and 
control of the National Guard in 1963, which he again kept until today. In 1967, the special 
post of “second deputy prime minister” was created for Fahd, underlining his ambitions to be 
next in line after his older half-brother Khaled, a moderate figure whom Faisal had made 
crown prince for reasons of seniority and intra-family balance119 – despite his disinterest in 
politics and lack of a previous government role.120 Institutional decisions again followed the 
royal power balance. 
 
All of the major princes embarked on the expansion of their institutions, which became 
irreducibly identified with their person. Growing budgets allowed for ambitious programs, 
most remarkably among them Sultan’s expansion of the Saudi air force in the 1960s.121 Staff 
numbers, business opportunities and networks of gatekeepers, brokers and business partners 
expanded concurrently. As the Ministry of Defence was organized around Sultan (and to a 
lesser extent his full brother deputies), all of its organizational units were oriented towards 
him as central authority. Armed services and Ministry itself hence cooperated little.122  
 
Similarly, Abdallah was the figure around which the National Guard was organized 
concentrically. Foreign specialists assessed the Guard’s chains of command as ill-defined and 
over-centralized. As the Guard was also a government agency, the presence of civilians in its 
headquarters, accountable only to Abdallah, decreased its administrative coherence.123  
 Faisal and the civil service: slow regularization 
Beyond the “sovereignty ministries”, most of the other posts in the 1962 cabinet were 
controlled by commoners, as Faisal strove to limit the number of princes in the cabinet to 
make it manageable124 – another pattern which would become “locked in”, as most of the 
cabinet posts reserved for non-royals then have been held by commoners until now.  
 
A stable distribution of power did not automatically mean integrated government. Under 
Faisal the Saudi administration still suffered from enduring problems of over-centralization 
and lack of coordination between agencies.125 As institutions grew in parallel, functionally 
similar bureaucratic units reported to different ministries, and duplication and conflicts of 
authority were endemic.126 As all actors were oriented towards Faisal, there was little 
horizontal communication of commoner bureaucrats, while Faisal’s brothers were busy 
building their fiefdoms. The phenomenon of “paper agencies” persisted, e.g. when a Ministry 
of Justice was decreed in 1962 but not actually set up until 1971. All good intentions of 
development planning got lost somewhere between agency conflicts and an insufficient data 
base.127 The Central Planning Organization, set up in 1964, had little leverage over other 
ministries during most of the 1960s,128 and several ministries never submitted their financial 
reports to the Ministry of Finance.129 
 
However, different from the sprawl of the state in the 1950s, there was a clear 
regularization of bureaucratic growth – both in terms of stability of the overall set-up and of 
internal bureaucratization of institutions. The set-up became less fluid. 
 
Although facing an acute shortage of qualified administrators, Faisal managed to assemble 
some good commoner ministers around him, which might explain that at least some decisions 
were carried through.130 “Elsewhere”, as one UK diplomatic source explains, “as so often in 
developing countries, it [was] the bureaucratic bindweed that [took] root and proliferated most 
quickly, its function being to choke decision and action.” 
 
The “bureaucratic bindweed” however did go along with institutionalization of the civil 
service, making for gradual institutional consolidation. Faisal achieved a discernible 
rationalization of the bureaucracy. As early as June 1958, a royal decree was issued reforming 
the civil service. It clarified the classification of employees, salary schedules and criteria for 
hiring and terminating employment.131 The use of public offices for private gain was 
prohibited and severe penalties threatened. Private business activities of bureaucrats were very 
common at the time, and the Americans rated the decree as a serious attempt by Faisal to 
decrease malpractice.132  
 
To be sure, overcoming the shortage of qualified and committed personnel was an uphill 
struggle in a grossly undereducated society.133 In the early 1960s, the Institute of Public 
Administration (IPA) in Riyadh was set up with international assistance and imparted basic 
administrative skills on increasing numbers of Saudis. Having to start almost from scratch, its 
impact was only gradual. At the end of the 1960s, the pool of skilled administrators was still 
very small and recruitment often based on nepotism.134 Many bureaucrats were involved in 
business interests tied to their respective agency.135 Absenteeism was rampant,136 and attempts 
by a large Ford Foundation consultancy mission in the 1960s to create a merit-based public 
service did not yield significant results, as the “Central Personnel Bureau” proved unable to 
break into the turf of other ministries.137  
 
Faisal’s own commitment to orderly and rule-bound administration should not be 
overstated. In his context, he was austere,138 but that did not mean that he did not have his 
own trustees, brokers and business clients whom he would pay off through various ways.139 
The Alireza family, close to Faisal since his time as Hijazi viceregent, was amply supplied 
with defense-related contracts.140 Princes from Faisal’s own family branch were heavily 
involved in business.141 Although the clientelist distribution of budgets and deals was 
relatively well-controlled under Faisal, his rule was no exception to the basic pattern.142  
  
Still, all nepotism and clientelism occurred within a progressively bureaucratized 
institutional setting, whose main components and cleavages did not change fundamentally 
after the early 1960s. The 1971 comprehensive civil service law led to further consolidation of 
bureaucratic rules and clearer formal concepts of salary scales, seniority and hierarchy.143 The 
Institute of Public Administration augmented its profile under the leadership of Abdalaziz 
Quraishi in the late 1960s, and increasing numbers of foreign-trained Saudis entered public 
service.144 The internal structures of agencies, though still fluid in many cases, were much 
better defined and permanent than ten years earlier.145  
 
The bureaucratic immortalization of fiefdoms in the 1970s 
When the Saudi system entered its final and dizzying phase of expansion after the 1973 oil 
boom, this expansion happened much more orderly and based on existing institutions than that 
of the 1950s.146 Paradoxically, bureaucratization and state growth also led to the entrenchment 
of existing fiefdoms in the boom – the final phase of state growth. As the budget quadrupled 
and total state employees increased from 52.000 in 1960 to 124.000 in 1970,147 royals had 
growing powers of patronage in their realms, while the entrenchment of civil service rules 
made for increased institutional stability on lower levels.148  
 
The defence budget, usually above one quarter of overall state expenditure, allowed Prince 
Sultan to expand his ministerial fiefdom to a full “state within a state”, attaching large-scale 
housing, health and educational infrastructure to his ministry. The biggest of Sultan’s artificial 
“military cities” in the Northern periphery of the kingdom was supposed to house 70.000 
persons alone.149 While the Saudi military was gradually formalized, all organizational units 
of the ministry remained organized around Sultan as central authority, hampering 
communication between them.150 
 
The National Guard under Abdallah developed similar structures on a smaller scale, 
having its own “cities” and parallel housing, education and health systems.151 The Ministry of 
Interior under Fahd and Nayef, dubbed a “rule unto itself”152 by a seasoned British diplomat, 
also built up its own infrastructure.  
 
All of the major fiefs conferred enormous patronage power to their heads, through the 
sheer scale of employment,153 the provision of select services and numerous business 
contracts of various sizes. Considerable parts of society were drawn into the orbit of the big 
government agencies as clients in one form or another.154 
 
The dynamics of growth would often reinforce segmentation: Ministry of Defense, 
National Guard and Ministry of Interior seem to have seen repeated competition over budget 
allocations, and there was a persistent overlap in security functions.155 The autonomous power 
of senior princes meant that they would ignore budgetary rules in their procurement, 
undermining coherent economic planning.156 The parallel build-up of independent housing 
and health services prevented integrated sectoral policies.157 The parallel power bases of 
princes would make national decision-making and, on a lower level, day-to-day policy 
coordination more difficult. 
 
Segmentation was reproduced on a smaller scale among agencies headed by trusted 
commoners. Due to the underdevelopment of general infrastructure and public services, 
agencies under conditions of fiscal abundance strove to create their own services to be able to 
develop autonomously.158 Institutions would function in more predictable and formal ways 
than in past decades; the civil service law was refined in 1977 and a further empowered Civil 
Service Bureau created.159 However, the persistent hierarchical orientation of various agencies 
meant that they often coordinated little in policy and budgeting matters. In the process of 
rapid growth they would acquire their own vested interests – and typically, their own housing 
and other infrastructure annexes, and in at least one case, their own TV studio and gas station 
services.160  
 
However, similar to the case of SAMA in the 1950s, further state expansion in the 1970s 
and early 1980s also allowed for some new islands of efficiency to emerge, staffed by the 
most promising technocrats and given relative autonomy from the rest of the civil service. 
These include the Saudi Ports Authority, the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation and 
the Riyadh Development Authority.161 Although the core structure of state and regime 
remained unaltered, the oil boom still allowed for new institutional creations on a technocratic 
level, offering great mobility to aspiring administrators, some of them successfully co-opted 
into the system despite their originally leftist leanings.162 Similarly, the boom was the last 
time when new big business names were added to those that had emerged in the 1950s, most 
saliently that of later Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who became a billionaire 
construction magnate under the patronage of King Fahd.  
 
Mobility closure and congealment 
The institutional fluidity of the 1950s and 1960s and the enduring mobility in the 1970s 
and early 1980s stand in sharp contrast to the stasis and mobility closure since the mid-1980s: 
Since the end of the boom, the expansion of the Saudi state has largely stopped, and with it 
change and mobility within the system. The institutions created since the early 1950s have 
congealed into a permanent set-up – through bureaucratic formalization and resource 
constraints, but also through the sheer size and scope of the state.  
 
Some well-known facts suffice to illustrate how the end of the boom has brought and end 
to the internal dynamic of the Saudi system: Not only have all the leading princes clung to 
their posts (until death in the case of Fahd), but Saudi business has seen very few big 
newcomers since the oil bust in 1986. The turnover of technocrats in the cabinet has decreased 
markedly, with their average age strongly increasing. 
 
There has been little change in the set-up of government agencies, which have proven to 
persist once they had grown. The socio-economic entitlements created through state growth 
seem to have fettered the once so autonomous system, with the wage bill steadily increasing 
as share of public expenditure between the early 1980s and the late 1990s. As more social 
groups have been tied to the state through the formalized clientage of employment and service 
provision, the government, it appears, has become increasingly immobile, largely incapable or 
unwilling to impose cuts on the public payroll and subsidized public services.163 The 
stickiness of bureaucratic employment prevents institutional re-engineering. Policy in the last 
20 years has been limited mostly to “putting out fires”, with few grand initiatives.164 
 
Conclusion  
For those who know the modern Saudi bureaucratic behemoth, its unmovable institutions 
and administrative stasis, the great fluidity of early years as traced in this article is hard to 
imagine. The modern Saudi bureaucracy was created in the 1950s and early 1960s by an elite 
which was largely unconstrained by society or established bureaucratic structures.  
 The rapid, personalized creation of government institutions happened in a completely top-
down fashion and in a relative political vacuum. Political agency and voluntarism determined 
state formation at least as much as the development needs of Saudi society did. The Al Saud 
laterally expanded into a state apparatus which was most of all geared upon their internal 
distribution of power. The rapid shifts in institutional design reflected the unique autonomy of 
the early Saudi rentier state and its role as playing field for intra-elite balancing games.  
 
Saudi bureaucracy-building often seems to be a case not of “form follows function”, but of 
“form follows family”. Institutional reforms often were instruments in an intra-elite power 
game as much as attempts to modernize the state. Where Yizraeli sees primarily a clash 
between different ideologies of rule and development between Saud and Faisal, the present 
account adds a rather more instrumental view of institutional initiatives by both players, with 
institutions as flexible tokens of power. It is not possible to glean specific princely 
motivations from the archival record on every single institutional decision. We do know 
however that power politics within the family – whatever its details – consistently loomed 
very large when it came to negotiating institutional change, like no other consideration. 
 
Shifts in state autonomy  
Rentier state theory posits state autonomy as a result of external state income. As far as 
autonomy is a useful concept at all, the present historical analysis of Saudi institutions 
indicates that it is not constant over time: Early state autonomy seems to have been uniquely 
large, and political agency determined structures of rule. In later years, conversely, the weight 
of established structures has taken away much of the political and distributional leeway the 
Saudi elite used to have. The rentier argument that external revenues gives state elites free 
reign – at least in underdeveloped states with relatively cohesive elites – seems to make much 
more sense in early phases of state-building and, to a lesser degree, while the expansion lasts. 
Similar patterns may be at work in other late developing rentier states: Frequent shifts in 
alliance and redesigns of the fledgling Omani state under Qaboos in the early 1970s e.g. have 
given way to more static development in subsequent decades.165 
 
Path-dependency of institutional design 
Many of today’s permanent features of the Saudi state can be traced back to early 
contingencies and the crucial juncture of 1962. Civil Aviation’s attachment to the Ministry of 
Defense, the Vice Ministry of Finance, the large size of the National Guard, the omnipresent 
role of the Ministry of Interior – all are outcomes of the politics of the day which happened to 
be perpetuated by bureaucratic growth and/or agreements to maintain a given power balance. 
Similarly, the composition of significant parts of the Saudi private sector is an outcome of 
often chance encounters which happened many decades ago. The expanding Saudi rentier 
state provides powerful examples of “path-dependency”, the idea that relatively small early 
events can have a strong influence on subsequent structural developments. The rapid growth 
of rentier states can lead to a “telescoping” effect, magnifying the effects of early decisions 
manifold, and locking them in as states grow mature and harder to change.  
 
More than any other event, the 1962 cabinet deal shaped the face of Saudi politics for the 
subsequent half century, but it also appears somewhat contingent in retrospective: There were 
e.g. reported offers by Saud to make Fahd his prime minister, which the latter rejected.166 Had 
Fahd accepted, Saudi Arabia and its institutions of governance would look much different 
today. There were also rumours that Mohammad bin Abdalaziz, an irascible older brother of 
Fahd, could be made Minister of Finance, which again would have changed the balance of 
power – and quite likely, institutions – tremendously.167 
 
Instead, sober Minister of Finance Prince Muscad bin cAbdalrahman controlled the fisc 
and helped to limit the intrusion of royals into the state. Although this policy was loosened 
under Fahd, Faisal’s decision to largely keep princes out of technocratic cabinet posts 1962 
established a pattern which has been perpetuated until today – different from other GCC states 
with large ruling families, which tend to have princely Ministers of Finance, Oil and 
Commerce.168 
 
Path-dependency of state segmentation 
Regularization and growth of the bureaucracy helped to reduce the fluidity of 
administrative structures, increasingly limiting change to the lower rungs of the state and 
entrenching senior office-holders within an established power balance. It also helped to 
deepen the fiefdom character of certain institutions which dominate the Saudi scence today.  
 
Ironically, in the first place it had been the lack of clearly defined bureaucratic hierarchies 
which tended to give institutions the character of personal courts and enabled small-scale 
empire-building. With formal procedures under-defined, ministries were frequently used for 
patronage and to recruit allies – not only by royals, but also by well-positioned commoners, 
several of whom left their mark on the Saudi state.  
 
As the state grew more complex and the Al Saud delegated authority only in specific 
institutional contexts, the fragmentation of the state did not disappear, but was often 
consolidated through bureaucratization. While Faisal’s over-centralization persisted, agencies 
often kept their island character, communicating mostly vertically.  
 
Again, many institutional idiosyncrasies of Saudi Arabia would not be thinkable without 
rent surpluses that allowed institutional sprawl and costly redundancy. In a starkly contrasting 
example from an originally quite similar country, John Davis has argued that oil rents in 
Libya allowed for the experiment of abolishing significant parts of the state.169 What these 
two most different oil states seem to demonstrate is that rents can most of all allow for 
unusual, possibly dysfunctional institutional experiments – without predicting what these will 
look like. 
 
Approaching rentier states from this angle, the focus is once more on contingency and 
agency, which are in turn crucial to understand the internal heterogeneity of the Saudi state: 
Oil income has in some cases has allowed for the creation of very efficient bureaucratic 
islands – SAMA et al, where select commoners played crucial roles –, but in others has 
boosted neo-patrimonialism. As long as the system expanded, oil created great leeway to do 
design institutions freely and in very different ways. Generalizations about the nature of the 
state are hence difficult: As political agency intervenes, rents do not automatically create 
inefficiency and corruption. At the same time, rapidly increasing rents might create a 
temptation to build institutional fiefdoms, as these can be convenient devices to cement 
coalitions within the elite. Again, this is not an automatic outcome, but the record of other oil 
states indicate that it is a distinct possibility yet overlooked by rentier theories.170  
 
Sarah Yizraeli contends that the management of family politics through handing over 
control of functionally differentiated formal institutions to senior royal players is more 
modern that the old patrimonialism under Ibn Saud and his first successor, centred mostly on 
the king’s court. As soon as individual formal posts become royal fiefs of their own, this 
judgment might be questionable. The paradox of Saudi state development is that modern, 
differentiated bureaucracy and royal patrimonialism have grown concurrently. 
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